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CVE-2026-98432: Is Your Linux Server Exposed, and What to Do Now

A use-after-free in the Linux kernel's IPv4 TCP handshake code can be reached without credentials through a listening IPv4 TCP port. Which servers are exposed, how to check yours, and what to do until they run a fixed kernel.

On this page · 4 sections
  1. What the flaw does
  2. Are your servers exposed?
  3. Patch the kernel, then reduce exposure while you wait
  4. Sources

In 30 seconds

What happens
CVE-2026-98432, a flaw in how the Linux kernel sets up IPv4 TCP connections, can let an outsider with no account crash a server or take full control.
Who it affects
Companies running Linux servers on kernel 4.4 or later that accept IPv4 connections such as SSH, HTTPS, mail or an API, including hosts that run containers.
First step
Compare each Linux server's kernel package with your distribution's advisory, starting with servers that accept connections from the internet, to see which are not yet fixed.
Our view
We would not wait for attack reports before scheduling this update: fixed kernels are out for current releases of the major server distributions, and public repositories claim to exploit the flaw. MPTCP is only the route the researchers demonstrated; the flaw itself is in how the kernel handles incoming IPv4 TCP connections. List your internet-facing Linux hosts, install the fixed kernel, and reboot. Use the packet filter below only to cover the time until that reboot.

CVE-2026-98432 is a use-after-free (the kernel keeps using memory it has already freed) in the Linux kernel's IPv4 TCP connection setup. The kernel's security team published it on 15 October 2026; the fix entered the main kernel tree on 5 October. Kernels from 4.4 up to the fixed releases are affected. An attacker needs no account and no action from anyone. They send crafted connection requests carrying IPv4 options to a listening IPv4 TCP port, and the bug triggers if they win a timing race. The kernel team and Red Hat rate it CVSS 3.1 9.8 (critical); SUSE rates it 8.1, because it scores the attack complexity as high.

On 27 October, the researchers who reported the bug described a proof of concept that ran commands as root on Linux servers with a Multipath TCP (MPTCP) listener. Their write-up does not include exploit code. Since then, other authors have published repositories on GitHub that claim to exploit this CVE; we have not tested them. One of them, updated on 15 November, describes root access obtained in lab virtual machines running Arch Linux 7.2 kernels. Its author says that result was reached with a kernel protection (page-table isolation) switched off, and that a version for systems with it on is not finished. As of 17 November 2026, CVE-2026-98432 is not in CISA's catalog of exploited vulnerabilities (version 2026.11.13), and our search found no public reports of attacks.

What the flaw does

When a server accepts a new IPv4 TCP connection, the kernel hands the IP options from the first packet to the new connection without copying them. If a retransmitted connection request arrives at the same moment, another processor core can still be using those options after they have been freed. The attacker sends a connection request with IPv4 options, then retransmits it to hit that window. A second path exists on servers that migrate pending connection requests between sockets (net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=1, off by default, or a BPF reuse-port migration program).

The CVE record lists a kernel crash, memory corruption and code execution as possible results; the researchers' proof of concept leaked a kernel pointer first and then ran a command as root. They note that a lost race only makes the connection attempt fail, without crashing the server, so an attacker can retry. Do not count on crashes as a warning sign.

IPv6 connections are not affected by the retransmission issue, because the kernel copies the options there. A similar IPv6 issue in request migration, which only matters with CALIPSO labels, is not covered by this fix; the kernel developers handle it in a separate patch.

Are your servers exposed?

Go through four questions for each Linux system:

  • Does it accept IPv4 TCP connections from the internet? Any reachable IPv4 TCP service counts, such as SSH, HTTPS, mail or an API. These hosts come first.
  • Which kernel does it run? Compare the package version with your distribution's advisory, not with the upstream number. Distributions backport fixes, so uname -r may show an old-looking version that is already patched. For reference, the first fixed upstream releases are 5.10.272, 5.15.223, 6.1.190, 6.6.159, 6.12.113, 6.18.56, 7.2.10 and 7.3, the first final mainline release with the fix (it landed in 7.3-rc7); later releases include it too.
  • Is MPTCP in use? The demonstrated root exploit needed an MPTCP listener. Since Go 1.24, Go programs open MPTCP listeners by default on Linux unless the program or its settings turn this off, so a Go service can use MPTCP without anyone choosing it. Check the actual listeners with the commands below. The Go team warns that the bug is not specific to MPTCP: a server without MPTCP may still be attackable in other ways.
  • Does it run containers? Containers share the host's kernel. Updating images does not help; the host kernel needs the fix.

Three commands show the running kernel and the MPTCP listeners in the host's own network namespace. They do not tell you whether a service is reachable from the internet, and a server without MPTCP listeners is not safe for that reason alone:

uname -r                    # running kernel
sysctl net.mptcp.enabled    # 1 = MPTCP allowed
sudo ss -lnMp               # MPTCP listeners and the programs behind them

Patch the kernel, then reduce exposure while you wait

1. Install the fixed kernel and reboot

This is what fixes the CVE; the other steps only reduce exposure. A new kernel package does nothing until the server boots into it, so plan the reboot together with the update. Start with internet-facing servers, then the rest. If your vendor offers live patching for your kernel, check its advisory for whether a live patch for this CVE is available.

2. Until then, drop IPv4 TCP packets that carry IP options

Red Hat's bulletin gives an nftables rule that drops incoming IPv4 TCP packets with IP options, the packets that trigger the bug. Red Hat expects ordinary application traffic to be unaffected: TCP's own options are in a different header and still pass. Applications that rely on IPv4 options will break. Save the rule as cve-2026-98432.nft:

table inet cve_2026_98432 {
    chain input {
        type filter hook input priority -310; policy accept;
        # IPv4 header longer than 20 bytes = the packet carries IP options
        ip protocol tcp ip hdrlength > 5 counter drop
    }
}

Load it, confirm it, and remove it once the fixed kernel is running:

sudo nft --check --file cve-2026-98432.nft
sudo nft --file cve-2026-98432.nft
sudo nft list table inet cve_2026_98432
# after the fixed kernel is running:
sudo nft delete table inet cve_2026_98432

Know its limits before you rely on it. Red Hat says the rule cannot fully prevent the attack and may disrupt workloads, so test it outside production first. A rule loaded this way does not survive a reboot. It sits on the input hook, so it filters packets addressed to the host itself; traffic forwarded to containers, or between containers on the same host, may not pass through it. AlmaLinux documents a variant on the prerouting hook that also drops forwarded packets, and warns that networks which depend on CIPSO or NetLabel security labels, which travel in IPv4 options, should not use such a filter. If the server reboots before the kernel update, load the rule again.

3. Turn off MPTCP if you do not use it

AlmaLinux documents disabling MPTCP, now and after reboots. The setting applies per network namespace, so containers with their own network namespace need it there too:

sudo sysctl -w net.mptcp.enabled=0
echo 'net.mptcp.enabled = 0' | sudo tee /etc/sysctl.d/90-disable-mptcp.conf

This blocks new MPTCP sockets only; restart services that already have MPTCP listeners. For a single Go program, the Go team documents GODEBUG=multipathtcp=0; it changes the default only, so code that turns MPTCP on explicitly keeps it, and the program has to be restarted. Programs that depend on MPTCP may behave differently; test them. This removes the setup the researchers demonstrated, but the server stays vulnerable through plain IPv4 TCP until it runs the fixed kernel.

4. Close TCP ports nobody needs from the internet

Each TCP service you take off the internet is one less way in for this bug, though the host still needs the fixed kernel. Databases, admin panels and monitoring tools rarely need to answer the whole internet; allow only known addresses or put them behind the VPN. It also reduces exposure to other bugs.


Sources

  • CVE record: CVE-2026-98432 in the NVD (Linux kernel CNA, published 15 October 2026), with the fixed stable releases and the upstream fix commit e3f33b0a1d89 (merged 5 October 2026).
  • Red Hat: RHSB-2026-016, use-after-free in kernel IPv4 (30 October 2026, updated 11 November), including the nftables rule.
  • SUSE, Debian, Ubuntu, Rocky Linux and Oracle Linux pages for CVE-2026-98432, and Ubuntu's security notices of 10–12 November 2026; checked 17 November 2026.
  • AlmaLinux blog, «CVE-2026-98432: Patched kernels released» (30 October 2026, updated 2 November): fixed kernel versions and interim steps.
  • Go security team, «Protecting against CVE-2026-98432» (golang-announce, 29 October 2026).
  • Anthropic, research write-up on the proof of concept (27 October 2026).
  • CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, version 2026.11.13; GitHub search for the CVE ID, 17 November 2026.

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