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Optimizely Web Served Malicious Code to 178 Organizations: What to Check

On 16 November 2026, malicious code added to Optimizely Web ran on the sites of 178 organizations. What it did, what is confirmed and what is not, and how to check from outside whether your site loads it.

On this page · 6 sections
  1. Short answer
  2. What the code did
  3. What is confirmed and what is not
  4. How to tell from outside whether your site loads Optimizely Web
  5. Three steps for a company without a security team
  6. Sources

In 30 seconds

What happens
On 16 November 2026, malicious code was added to Optimizely Web, an A/B-testing service, and ran on the sites of at least 178 organizations that load it.
Who it affects
Companies whose sites load Optimizely Web, and people who visited those sites on 16 November, especially on an iPhone or iPad that was not up to date.
First step
Check whether your sites load a script from cdn.optimizely.com; if they do, review that project's code and access with whoever runs it.
Our view
A script loaded from a trusted provider runs with the same rights as your own code. Few companies keep a list of the outside scripts on their pages, and fewer notice when one of them changes. We would start with that list.

On 16 November 2026, someone added malicious JavaScript to Optimizely Web, a service many large sites use to test versions of their pages. For most of that day, visitors to the sites of 178 organizations received the code from Optimizely's own domain. Report URI, a company that monitors the scripts running on websites, found and documented it; Optimizely confirmed the incident early on 17 November.

Short answer

  • What happened: an attacker added code to customer projects in Optimizely Web. It swapped crypto wallet addresses, captured card details typed into forms and, on iPhones and iPads, tried to load known exploit kits.
  • Who is affected: Report URI found the code in 188 snippets belonging to 178 organizations, among them Zoom, the BBC, CNN, GitLab and HSBC, and says the real number is likely higher. Visitors to those sites on 16 November are affected too.
  • Is it still going: according to Report URI, all infected Optimizely files were clean by 23:11 UTC on 16 November. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability and removed the code.
  • What to do: if your site loads Optimizely Web, review the code in your projects and who has access, and treat card details entered on those pages that day as possibly exposed. Update iPhones and iPads.

Checked on 17 November 2026 against Report URI's research and its update of 17 November, Optimizely's status page and the cve.tools summary.

What the code did

Optimizely Web works through a JavaScript file that each customer's site loads from cdn.optimizely.com. The file can carry custom code that runs on every page. Report URI says the attacker put a loader into that custom code and left the rest of the file as it was. The file kept coming from Optimizely's trusted domain, so allowing that domain protected nobody. Report URI also says the content delivery network was not poisoned: it served what it was given.

  • Crypto address swapping: wallet addresses on the page, in the clipboard and in outgoing requests were replaced with the attacker's.
  • Card skimming, added at 13:43 UTC: the card number, expiry date and CVV were captured from forms. Payment fields hosted by a provider in a separate frame, such as Stripe or Adyen, were out of reach.
  • Data theft: when it swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, the code sent the page address, the original addresses, cookies not marked HttpOnly and a screenshot to the attacker's server.
  • iPhones and iPads: the code loaded the exploit kits Coruna (iOS 13 to 17) and DarkSword (iOS 18). Google's Threat Intelligence Group described both earlier in 2026; they work only on devices that have not been updated.

By 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040, according to Report URI. How many cards were captured is not known. The way in was a provider's platform, as in several other recent cases; see what the October–November attacks have in common.

What is confirmed and what is not

  • Confirmed by Optimizely: an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability, removed the code and secured affected user accounts. Its status page gives no number of customers and no technical detail.
  • Measured by Report URI: 188 infected snippets out of 1,611 it checked; the earliest injection it saw at 04:21 UTC; all infected files clean by 23:11 UTC.
  • Not known as of 17 November: how the attacker got write access to so many customers' projects, how many visitors received the code, and how many cards or cookies were captured. Report URI's link between this attacker and earlier campaigns is its own analysis and has not been confirmed independently.

How to tell from outside whether your site loads Optimizely Web

You do not need access to the server for a first answer. Open your site in a desktop browser, open the developer tools (F12), go to the Network tab, reload the page and type "optimizely" in the filter. A request to cdn.optimizely.com means the page loads Optimizely Web. Clear the filter and the same list shows every other outside host the page loads scripts from: analytics, chat, advertising, tag managers.

Do this on each of your sites, not only the main one: landing pages, online shops and old campaign sites often carry their own tags. Forgotten sites are the hard part; it helps to compare the sites you know about with what is actually visible.

The same tools show whether a page sends a Content Security Policy (CSP), a header that tells the browser which scripts may run and where the page may send data. Report URI crawled 256 sites of affected organizations and grouped the results by organization: 68 had no CSP at all, and at 24 the CSP blocked the malicious code.

Three steps for a company without a security team

  1. Find out whether you use Optimizely Web. Check each site as described above, or ask your marketing team or agency: A/B tests are often run by marketing, not by IT.
  2. If you do, review the projects and the access. Search the custom code of each project and each experiment for 1688360.cc, webshell.lol, atob( and code nobody recognizes, and check what browsers actually receive, not only what the dashboard shows. Remove users, API tokens and integrations you do not know, and change the passwords and tokens that can edit your Optimizely projects. If customers type card numbers into your own form fields on pages with the snippet, rather than into a payment provider's hosted frame, talk to your payment provider about cards entered on 16 November. Replace session tokens kept in cookies not marked HttpOnly.
  3. Limit what outside scripts can do. Ask your developer for a CSP that allows only the script hosts you use and limits where pages may send data. Avoid 'unsafe-eval' where you can, but note that Optimizely's support documentation says some of its features need it. Subresource Integrity (SRI) pins a script to a known version, which does not work for a script that changes by design, like Optimizely's; for those, watch what the script serves.

If you or your staff visited an affected site on 16 November: update iPhones and iPads to the latest iOS they support (according to Report URI, the attack code itself treats iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 and later as patched), check crypto transfers made that day for a changed address, and watch card statements.


Sources

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